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March 7, 2005 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR 0 7 2005 VIA HAND DELIVERY 
The Honorable Pat Bartholomew 
Clerk of the Court 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Matheson Courthouse, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Armand L. Smith et al„ Appellees v. Utah State Treasurer, Additional 
Rule 19 Defendant and Appellant. 
AppealjMo. 20040675-SC 
Dear Madam Clerk: 
Pursuant to Utah Appellate Rule 24(i), the Appellees Smiths, through their record 
counsel, herewith submit a Supplemental Authority which has come to our attention after 
the Appellees' Brief was filed on December 14, 2004 and the State Treasurer's Reply Brief 
filed on January 18, 2005. It is pertinent and significant to the above-referenced appeal 
1. Appellees at pp. 29-31 of their Brief, cite and analyze the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit decision in Banaitis v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003) with respect to the inclusion of 
punitive damage awards, part of which was payable to the State of Oregon, 
within the gross income, under the Alternative Minimum Tax, of the party-
taxpayer securing the award. Appellees indicated that the Supreme Court 
of the United States had granted certiorari to review the part of the decision 
related to the inclusion of attorneys' fees as gross income under said tax. 
The Appellant, State Treasurer, also discussed the Banaitis decision in 
Appellant's Reply Brief, pp. 16-19. 
On January 24, 2005, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision 
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Banaitis, Sub. Norn. CommY. v. 
Banks, 543 U.S. 125 S.Ct. 826 (2005) with respect to the dominion 
and control of the litigation and the inclusion in gross income under the 
Alternative Minimum Tax of attorneys' fees paid by the taxpayer securing the 
compensatory and punitive damage award. See Attachment. The time for 
filing a Petition for Rehearing has expired and the decision is final. 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, P.C 
Hon. Pat Bartholomew 
March 7, 2005 
Page 2 
Without comment, the Banaitis decision of the U. S. Supreme Court is submitted to 
the Court as Supplemental Authority. 
A copy of this letter and Attachment is being served by mail on State Treasurer's 
counsel. 
Respectfully yours, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL 
JENNIFER ANDERSON WHITLOCK 




cc: Kevin V. Olsen, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
James S Jardine, Esq. 
Non-party counsel 
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2004 1 
Syllabus 
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 
being done m connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. BANKS 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
No. 03-892. Argued November 1, 2004—Decided January 24, 2005* 
Respondent Banks settled his federal employment discrimination suit 
against a California state agency and respondent Banaitis settled his 
Oregon state case against his former employer, but neither included 
fees paid to their attorneys under contingent-fee agreements as gross 
income on their federal income tax returns. In each case petitioner 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency, 
which the Tax Court upheld. In Banks' case, the Sixth Circuit re-
versed in part, finding that the amount Banks paid to his attorney 
was not includable as gross income. In Banaitis' case, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that because Oregon law grants attorneys a superior lien 
in the contingent-fee portion of any recovery, that part of Banaitis* 
settlement was not includable as gross income. 
Held: When a litigant's recovery constitutes income, the litigant's in-
come includes the portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a 
contingent fee. Pp. 5-12. 
(a) Two preliminary observations help clarify why this issue is of 
consequence. First, taking the legal expenses as miscellaneous item-
ized deductions would have been of no help to respondents because 
the Alternative Minimum Tax establishes a tax liability floor and 
does not allow such deductions. Second, the American Jobs Creation 
Act of 2004—which amended the Internal Revenue Code to allow a 
taxpayer, in computing adjusted gross income, to deduct attorney's 
fees such as those at issue—does not apply here because it was 
passed after these cases arose and is not retroactive. Pp. 5-6. 
* Together with No. 03-907, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ba-
naitis, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. 
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(b) The Code defines "gross income" broadly to include all economic 
gains not otherwise exempted. Under the anticipatory assignment of 
income doctrine, a taxpayer cannot exclude an economic gain from 
gross income by assigning the gain in advance to another party, e.g., 
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. I l l , because gains should be taxed "to those 
who earn them," id., at 114. The doctrine is meant to prevent tax-
payers from avoiding taxation through arrangements and contracts 
devised to prevent income from vesting in the one who earned it. Id., 
at 115. Because the rule is preventative and motivated by adminis-
trative and substantive concerns, this Court does not inquire whether 
any particular assignment has a discernible tax avoidance purpose. 
Pp. 6-7. 
(c) The Court agrees with the Commissioner that a contingent-fee 
agreement should be viewed as an anticipatory assignment to the at-
torney of a portion of the client's income from any litigation recovery. 
In an ordinary case attribution of income is resolved by asking 
whether a taxpayer exercises complete dominion over the income in 
question. However, in the context of anticipatory assignments, where 
the assignor may not have dominion over the income at the moment 
of receipt, the question is whether the assignor retains dominion over 
the income-generating asset. Looking to such control preserves the 
principle that income should be taxed to the party who earns the in-
come and enjoys the consequent benefits. In the case of a litigation 
recovery the income-generating asset is the cause of action derived 
from the plaintiffs legal injury. The plaintiff retains dominion over 
this asset throughout the litigation. Respondents' counterarguments 
are rejected. The legal claim's value may be speculative at the mo-
ment of the assignment, but the anticipatory assignment doctrine is 
not limited to instances when the precise dollar value of the assigned 
income is known in advance. In these cases, the taxpayer retained 
control over the asset, diverted some of the income produced to an-
other party, and realized a benefit by doing so. Also rejected is re-
spondents' suggestion that the attorney-client relationship be treated 
as a sort of business partnership or joint venture for tax purposes. In 
fact, that relationship is a quintessential principal-agent relation-
ship, for the client retains ultimate dominion and control over the 
underlying claim. The attorney can make tactical decisions without 
consulting the client, but the client still must determine whether to 
settle or proceed to judgment and make, as well, other critical deci-
sions. The attorney is an agent who is duty bound to act in the prin-
cipal's interests, and so it is appropriate to treat the full recovery 
amount as income to the principal. This rule applies regardless of 
whether the attorney-client contract or state law confers any special 
rights or protections on the attorney, so long as such protections do 
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not alter the relationship's fundamental principal-agent character. 
The Court declines to comment on other theories proposed by respon-
dents and their amid, which were not advanced in earlier stages of 
the litigation or examined by the Courts of Appeals. Pp. 7-10. 
(d) This Court need not address Banks' contention that application 
of the anticipatory assignment principle would be inconsistent with 
the purpose of statutory fee-shifting provisions, such as those appli-
cable in his case brought under 42 U. S. C. §§1981, 1983, and 2000(e) 
et seq. He settled his case, and the fee paid to his attorney was calcu-
lated based solely on the contingent-fee contract. There was no court-
ordered fee award or any indication in his contract with his attorney 
or the settlement that the contingent fee paid was in lieu of statutory 
fees that might otherwise have been recovered. Also, the American 
Jobs Creation Act redresses the concern for many, perhaps most, 
claims governed by fee-shifting statutes. P. 11. 
No. 03-892, 345 F. 3d 373; No. 03-907, 340 F. 3d 1074, reversed and 
remanded. 
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other 
Members joined, except REHNQUIST, C. J., who took no part in the deci-
sion of the cases. 
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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 03-892 and 03-907 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 
PETITIONER 
03-892 v. 
JOHN W. BANKS, II 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 
PETITIONER 
03-907 v. 
SIGITAS J. BANAITIS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[January 24, 2005] 
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in these consolidated cases is whether the 
portion of a money judgment or settlement paid to a plain-
tiffs attorney under a contingent-fee agreement is income 
to the plaintiff under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 
U. S. C. §1 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. I). The issue di-
vides the courts of appeals. In one of the instant cases, 
Banks v. Commissioner, 345 F. 3d 373 (2003), the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held the contingent-fee por-
tion of a litigation recovery is not included in the plaintiffs 
gross income. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits also adhere to this view, relying on the 
holding, over Judge Wisdom's dissent, in Cotnam v. Com-
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missioner, 263 F. 2d 119, 125-126 (CA5 1959). Srivastava 
v. Commissioner, 220 F. 3d 353, 363-365 (CA5 2000); 
Foster v. United States, 249 F. 3d 1275, 1279-1280 (CA11 
2001). In the other case under review, Banaitis v. Com-
missioner, 340 F. 3d 1074 (2003), the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held that the portion of the recovery 
paid to the attorney as a contingent fee is excluded from 
the plaintiffs gross income if state law gives the plaintiffs 
attorney a special property interest in the fee, but not 
otherwise. Six Courts of Appeals have held the entire 
litigation recovery, including the portion paid to an attor-
ney as a contingent fee, is income to the plaintiff. Some of 
these Courts of Appeals discuss state law, but little of 
their analysis appears to turn on this factor. Raymond v. 
United States, 355 F. 3d 107, 113-116 (CA2 2004); Kenseth 
v. Commissioner, 259 F. 3d 881, 883-884 (CA7 2001); 
Baylin v. United States, 43 F. 3d 1451, 1454-1455 (CA 
Fed. 1995). Other Courts of Appeals have been explicit 
that the fee portion of the recovery is always income to the 
plaintiff regardless of the nuances of state law. O'Brien v. 
Commissioner, 38 T. C. 707, 712 (1962), aff d, 319 F. 2d 
532 (CA3 1963) (per curiam); Young v. Commissioner, 240 
F. 3d 369, 377-379 (CA4 2001); Hukkanen-CampfceZZ v. 
Commissioner, 274 F. 3d 1312, 1313-1314 (CA10 2001). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 541 U. S. 958 
(2004). 
We hold that, as a general rule, when a litigant's recov-
ery constitutes income, the litigant's income includes the 
portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a contingent 
fee. We reverse the decisions of the Courts of Appeals for 
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. 
I 
A. Commissioner v. Banks 
In 1986, respondent John W. Banks, II, was fired from 
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his job as an educational consultant with the California 
Department of Education. He retained an attorney on a 
contingent-fee basis and filed a civil suit against the em-
ployer in a United States District Court. The complaint 
alleged employment discrimination in violation of 42 
U. S. C. §§1981 and 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., and Cal. 
Govt. Code Ann. §12965 (West 1986). The original com-
plaint asserted various additional claims under state law, 
but Banks later abandoned these. After trial commenced 
in 1990, the parties settled for $464,000. Banks paid 
$150,000 of this amount to his attorney pursuant to the 
fee agreement. 
Banks did not include any of the $464,000 in settlement 
proceeds as gross income in his 1990 federal income tax 
return. In 1997 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
issued Banks a notice of deficiency for the 1990 tax year. 
The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's determination, 
finding that all the settlement proceeds, including the 
$150,000 Banks had paid to his attorney, must be included 
in Banks' gross income. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in 
part. 345 F. 3d 373 (2003). It agreed the net amount 
received by Banks was included in gross income but not 
the amount paid to the attorney. Relying on its prior 
decision in Estate of Clarks v. Commissioner, 202 F. 3d 
854 (2000), the court held the contingent-fee agreement 
was not an anticipatory assignment of Banks' income 
because the litigation recovery was not already earned, 
vested, or even relatively certain to be paid when the 
contingent-fee contract was made. A contingent-fee ar-
rangement, the court reasoned, is more like a partial 
assignment of income-producing property than an assign-
ment of income. The attorney is not the mere beneficiary 
of the client's largess, but rather earns his fee through 
skill and diligence. 345 F. 3d, at 384-385 (quoting Estate 
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of Clarks, supra, at 857-858). This reasoning, the court 
held, applies whether or not state law grants the attorney 
any special property interest {e.g., a superior hen) in part 
of the judgment or settlement proceeds. 
B. Commissioner v. Banaitis 
After leaving his job as a vice president and loan officer 
at the Bank of California in 1987, Sigitas J. Banaitis 
retained an attorney on a contingent-fee basis and brought 
suit in Oregon state court against the Bank of Cahfornia 
and its successor in ownership, the Mitsubishi Bank. The 
complaint alleged that Mitsubishi Bank willfully inter-
fered with Banaitis' employment contract, and that the 
Bank of California attempted to induce Banaitis to breach 
his fiduciary duties to customers and discharged him 
when he refused. The jury awarded Banaitis compensa-
tory and punitive damages. After resolution of all appeals 
and post-trial motions, the parties settled. The defendants 
paid $4,864,547 to Banaitis; and, following the formula set 
forth in the contingent-fee contract, the defendants paid 
an additional $3,864,012 directly to Banaitis' attorney. 
Banaitis did not include the amount paid to his attorney 
in gross income on his federal income tax return, and the 
Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency. The Tax 
Court upheld the Commissioner's determination, but the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 340 F. 3d 
1074 (2003). In contrast to the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, the Banaitis court viewed state law as 
pivotal. Where state law confers on the attorney no spe-
cial property rights in his fee, the court said, the whole 
amount of the judgment or settlement ordinarily is in-
cluded in the plaintiff's gross income. Id., at 1081. Ore-
gon state law, however, like the law of some other States, 
grants attorneys a superior hen in the contingent-fee 
portion of any recovery. As a result, the court held, con-
tingent-fee agreements under Oregon law operate not as 
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an anticipatory assignment of the client's income but as a 
partial transfer to the attorney of some of the client's 
property in the lawsuit. 
II 
To clarify why the issue here is of any consequence for 
tax purposes, two preliminary observations are useful. 
The first concerns the general issue of deductibility. For 
the tax years in question the legal expenses in these cases 
could have been taken as miscellaneous itemized deduc-
tions subject to the ordinary requirements, 26 U. S. C. 
§§67-68 (2000 ed. and Supp. I), but doing so would have 
been of no help to respondents because of the operation of 
the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). For noncorporate 
individual taxpayers, the AMT establishes a tax liability 
floor equal to 26 percent of the taxpayer's "alternative 
minimum taxable income" (minus specified exemptions) 
up to $175,000, plus 28 percent of alternative minimum 
taxable income over $175,000. §§55(a), (b) (2000 ed.). 
Alternative minimum taxable income, unlike ordinary 
gross income, does not allow any miscellaneous itemized 
deductions. §§56(b)(l)(A)(i). 
Second, after these cases arose Congress enacted the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 118 Stat. 1418. 
Section 703 of the Act amended the Code by adding 
§62(a)(19). Id., at 1546. The amendment allows a tax-
payer, in computing adjusted gross income, to deduct 
"attorney fees and court costs paid by, or on behalf of, the 
taxpayer in connection with any action involving a claim 
of unlawful discrimination." Ibid. The Act defines 
"unlawful discrimination" to include a number of specific 
federal statutes, §§62(e)(l) to (16), any federal whistle-
blower statute, §62(e)(17), and any federal, state, or local 
law "providing for the enforcement of civil rights" or "regu-
lating any aspect of the employment relationship . . . or 
prohibiting the discharge of an employee, the discrimina-
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tion against an employee, or any other form of retaliation 
or reprisal against an employee for asserting rights or 
taking other actions permitted by law," §62(e)(18). Id., at 
1547-1548. These deductions are permissible even when 
the AMT applies. Had the Act been in force for the trans-
actions now under review, these cases likely would not 
have arisen. The Act is not retroactive, however, so while 
it may cover future taxpayers in respondents' position, it 
does not pertain here. 
Ill 
The Internal Revenue Code defines "gross income" for 
federal tax purposes as "all income from whatever source 
derived." 26 U. S. C. §61(a). The definition extends 
broadly to all economic gains not otherwise exempted. 
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U. S. 426, 429-30 
(1955); Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U. S. 28, 49 (1949). 
A taxpayer cannot exclude an economic gain from gross 
income by assigning the gain in advance to another party. 
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. I l l (1930); Commissioner v. Sun-
nen, 333 U. S. 591, 604 (1948); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 
112, 116-117 (1940). The rationale for the so-called antici-
patory assignment of income doctrine is the principle that 
gains should be taxed "to those who earn them," Lucas, 
supra, at 114, a maxim we have called "the first principle of 
income taxation," Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U. S. 
733, 739-740 (1949). The anticipatory assignment doctrine 
is meant to prevent taxpayers from avoiding taxation 
through "arrangements and contracts however skillfully 
devised to prevent [income] when paid from vesting even for 
a second in the man who earned it." Lucas, 281 U. S., at 
115. The rule is preventative and motivated by administra-
tive as well as substantive concerns, so we do not inquire 
whether any particular assignment has a discernible tax 
avoidance purpose. As Lucas explained, "no distinction can 
be taken according to the motives leading to the arrange-
Cite as: 543 U. S. (2005) 7 
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ment by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree 
from that on which they grew." Ibid. 
Respondents argue that the anticipatory assignment 
doctrine is a judge-made antifraud rule with no relevance 
to contingent-fee contracts of the sort at issue here. The 
Commissioner maintains that a contingent-fee agreement 
should be viewed as an anticipatory assignment to the 
attorney of a portion of the client's income from any litiga-
tion recovery. We agree with the Commissioner. 
In an ordinary case attribution of income is resolved by 
asking whether a taxpayer exercises complete dominion 
over the income in question. Glenshaw Glass Co., supra, 
at 431; see also Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & 
Light Co., 493 U. S. 203, 209 (1990); Commissioner v. First 
Security Bank of Utah, N. A , 405 U. S. 394, 403 (1972). In 
the context of anticipatory assignments, however, the 
assignor often does not have dominion over the income at 
the moment of receipt. In that instance the question 
becomes whether the assignor retains dominion over the 
income-generating asset, because the taxpayer "who owns 
or controls the source of the income, also controls the 
disposition of that which he could have received himself 
and diverts the payment from himself to others as the 
means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants." Horst, 
supra, at 116-117. See also Lucas, supra, at 114-115; 
Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122, 124-125 (1940); Sun-
nen, supra, at 604. Looking to control over the income-
generating asset, then, preserves the principle that income 
should be taxed to the party who earns the income and 
enjoys the consequent benefits. 
In the case of a litigation recovery the income-
generating asset is the cause of action that derives from 
the plaintiffs legal injury. The plaintiff retains dominion 
over this asset throughout the litigation. We do not un-
derstand respondents to argue otherwise. Rather, respon-
dents advance two counterarguments. First, they say 
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that, in contrast to the bond coupons assigned in Horst, 
the value of a legal claim is speculative at the moment of 
assignment, and may be worth nothing at all. Second, 
respondents insist that the claimant's legal injury is not 
the only source of the ultimate recovery. The attorney, 
according to respondents, also contributes income-
generating assets—effort and expertise—without which 
the claimant likely could not prevail. On these premises 
respondents urge us to treat a contingent-fee agreement 
as establishing, for tax purposes, something like a joint 
venture or partnership in which the client and attorney 
combine their respective assets—the client's claim and the 
attorney's skill—and apportion any resulting profits. 
We reject respondents' arguments. Though the value of 
the plaintiffs claim may be speculative at the moment the 
fee agreement is signed, the anticipatory assignment 
doctrine is not limited to instances when the precise dollar 
value of the assigned income is known in advance. Lucas, 
supra; United States v. Bayse, 410 U. S. 441, 445, 450-452 
(1973). Though Horst involved an anticipatory assign-
ment of a predetermined sum to be paid on a specific date, 
the holding in that case did not depend on ascertaining a 
liquidated amount at the time of assignment. In the cases 
before us, as in Horst, the taxpayer retained control over 
the income-generating asset, diverted some of the income 
produced to another party, and realized a benefit by doing 
so. As Judge Wesley correctly concluded in a recent case, 
the rationale of Horst applies fully to a contingent-
fee contract. Raymond v. United States, 355 F. 3d, at 
115-116. That the amount of income the asset would 
produce was uncertain at the moment of assignment is of 
no consequence. 
We further reject the suggestion to treat the attorney-
client relationship as a sort of business partnership or 
joint venture for tax purposes. The relationship between 
client and attorney, regardless of the variations in particu-
Cite as: 543 U. S. (2005) 9 
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lar compensation agreements or the amount of skill and 
effort the attorney contributes, is a quintessential princi-
pal-agent relationship. Restatement (Second) of Agency 
§1, Comment e (1957) (hereinafter Restatement); ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3, Comments 
1, 1.7 1 (2002). The client may rely on the attorney's 
expertise and special skills to achieve a result the client 
could not achieve alone. That, however, is true of most 
principal-agent relationships, and it does not alter the fact 
that the client retains ultimate dominion and control over 
the underlying claim. The control is evident when it is 
noted that, although the attorney can make tactical deci-
sions without consulting the client, the plaintiff still must 
determine whether to settle or proceed to judgment and 
make, as well, other critical decisions. Even where the 
attorney exercises independent judgment without supervi-
sion by, or consultation with, the client, the attorney, as 
an agent, is obligated to act solely on behalf of, and for the 
exclusive benefit of, the client-principal, rather than for 
the benefit of the attorney or any other party. Restate-
ment §§13, 39, 387. 
The attorney is an agent who is duty bound to act only 
in the interests of the principal, and so it is appropriate to 
treat the full amount of the recovery as income to the 
principal. In this respect Judge Posner's observation is 
apt: "[T]he contingent-fee lawyer [is not] a joint owner of 
his client's claim in the legal sense any more than the 
commission salesman is a joint owner of his employer's 
accounts receivable." Kenseth, 259 F. 3d, at 883. In both 
cases a principal relies on an agent to realize an economic 
gain, and the gain realized by the agent's efforts is income 
to the principal. The portion paid to the agent may be 
deductible, but absent some other provision of law it is not 
excludable from the principal's gross income. 
This rule applies whether or not the attorney-client 
contract or state law confers any special rights or protec-
10 COMMISSIONER v. BANKS 
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tions on the attorney, so long as these protections do not 
alter the fundamental principal-agent character of the 
relationship. Cf. Restatement §13, Comment b, and §14G, 
Comment a (an agency relationship is created where a 
principal assigns a chose in action to an assignee for col-
lection and grants the assignee a security interest in the 
claim against the assignor's debtor in order to compensate 
the assignee for his collection efforts). State laws vary 
with respect to the strength of an attorney's security 
interest in a contingent fee and the remedies available to 
an attorney should the client discharge or attempt to 
defraud the attorney. No state laws of which we are 
aware, however, even those that purport to give attorneys 
an "ownership" interest in their fees, e.g., 340 F. 3d, at 
1082-1083 (discussing Oregon law); Cotnam, 263 F. 2d, at 
125 (discussing Alabama law), convert the attorney from 
an agent to a partner. 
Respondents and their amid propose other theories to 
exclude fees from income or permit deductibility. These 
suggestions include: (1) The contingent-fee agreement 
establishes a Subchapter K partnership under 26 U. S. C. 
§§702, 704, and 761, Brief for Respondent Banaitis in No. 
03-907, p. 5—21; (2) litigation recoveries are proceeds from 
disposition of property, so the attorney's fee should be 
subtracted as a capital expense pursuant to §§1001, 1012, 
and 1016, Brief for Association of Trial Lawyers of 
America as Amicus Curiae 23-28, Brief for Charles 
Davenport as Amicus Curiae 3-13; and (3) the fees are 
deductible reimbursed employee business expenses under 
§62(a)(2)(A) (2000 ed. and Supp. I), Brief for Stephen 
Cohen as Amicus Curiae. These arguments, it appears, 
are being presented for the first time to this Court. We 
are especially reluctant to entertain novel propositions of 
law with broad implications for the tax system that were 
not advanced in earlier stages of the litigation and not 
examined by the Courts of Appeals. We decline comment 
Cite as: 543 U. S. (2005) 11 
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on these supplementary theories. In addition, we do not 
reach the instance where a relator pursues a claim on 
behalf of the United States. Brief for Taxpayers Against 
Fraud Education Fund as Amicus Curiae 10-20. 
IV 
The foregoing suffices to dispose of Banaitis' case. 
Banks' case, however, involves a further consideration. 
Banks brought his claims under federal statutes that 
authorize fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs' attorneys. 
He contends that application of the anticipatory assign-
ment principle would be inconsistent with the purpose of 
statutory fee shifting provisions. See Venegas v. Mitchell, 
495 U. S. 82, 86 (1990) (observing that statutory fees enable 
"plaintiffs to employ reasonably competent lawyers without 
cost to themselves if they prevail"). In the federal system 
statutory fees are typically awarded by the court under 
the lodestar approach, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 
433 (1983), and the plaintiff usually has little control over 
the amount awarded. Sometimes, as when the plaintiff 
seeks only injunctive relief, or when the statute caps plain-
tiffs' recoveries, or when for other reasons damages are 
substantially less than attorney's fees, court-awarded attor-
ney's fees can exceed a plaintiffs monetary recovery. See, 
e.g., Riverside v. Rivera, All U.S. 561, 564-565 (1986) 
(compensatory and punitive damages of $33,350; attorney's 
fee award of $245,456.25). Treating the fee award as in-
come to the plaintiff in such cases, it is argued, can lead to 
the perverse result that the plaintiff loses money by winning 
the suit. Furthermore, it is urged that treating statutory fee 
awards as income to plaintiffs would undermine the effec-
tiveness of fee-shifting statutes in deputizing plaintiffs and 
their lawyers to act as private attorneys general. 
We need not address these claims. After Banks settled 
his case, the fee paid to his attorney was calculated solely 
on the basis of the private contingent-fee contract. There 
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was no court-ordered fee award, nor was there any indica-
tion in Banks' contract with his attorney, or in the settle-
ment agreement with the defendant, that the contingent 
fee paid to Banks' attorney was in lieu of statutory fees 
Banks might otherwise have been entitled to recover. 
Also, the amendment added by the American Jobs Crea-
tion Act redresses the concern for many, perhaps most, 
claims governed by fee-shifting statutes. 
* * * 
For the reasons stated, the judgments of the Courts of 
Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits are reversed, and 
the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the decision of these 
cases. 
